Reconstruction of the Osong disaster… The Emergency Rescue Control Team was activated, but there was no ‘road control’

The key to disaster control is whether or not the ’emergency rescue control group’ is operating… Chungcheongbuk-do is not even operating,

and the government is focusing on the responsibility of the police in relation to the flooding of the Gungpyeong 2 underpass in Osong-eup, Cheongju-si, Chungcheongbuk-do at 8:37 am on the 15th. However, there is something unclear. The key to the failure of this disaster prevention is the question of whether ‘disaster control’ has been properly implemented.

The point where Mihocheon, which flows across Cheongju, Chungcheongbuk-do, crossed the temporary embankment and overflowed, was only 250 meters away from the underpass. As the Mihocheon overflowed and the water poured into the road, the underpass was quickly flooded. The key is to recognize flooding in advance and respond appropriately.

According to <Freshian>’s coverage, the first time that the possibility of flooding of the Mihocheon temporary embankment was recognized was at 7:51 am, an hour before the accident. This is the first time that Jang Mo, a resident of Gungpyeong-ri, called 119 and reported that “the temporary embankment of Miho Stream is likely to be lost.” Around the same time, at 7:58 a.m., a 112 report was filed with the police saying, “Gungpyeong Underpass also needs to be controlled.” However, the management of the underpass is not the police, but Chungcheongbuk-do.

After receiving the report, the Chungcheongbuk-do 119 Situation Room immediately mobilized two firefighters from the Cheongju West Fire Station, the jurisdictional fire department. Firefighters arrived on the scene about 10 minutes after the report and began to assess the situation. According to the reporter Jang Mo, who was at the scene, when the fire brigade arrived, there were 5 to 6 people, including the complainant himself, his wife, and a construction company official .

This was at 8:03 am, 24 minutes before the accident. At that time, the raging current had already broken the embankment and flooded it. At that time, the firefighters who came to the scene delivered the site situation to the situation room of the Chungcheongbuk-do Fire Headquarters. The Situation Room made a call to the Cheongju City Guard Office, not the management body of the Gungpyeong 2 Underpass, saying, “It is an emergency situation with flooding of the embankment, so take action quickly.” It ended here. The possibility of not recognizing ‘hazard information’ is raised, but to understand this incident, we need to look at the disaster safety system.

In the case of the Gungpyeong Underpass Disaster, there are three major disaster prevention measures. In terms of whether the embankment was controlled or not, first, the management of the Mihocheon water level is under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Environment, and second, the management body for the temporary embankment built for the Mihocheon Bridge reconstruction project is the Multifunctional Administrative City Construction Agency (Happiness Administration). Third, road control is a matter for local governments. The police are only in charge of ‘traffic control’, but the road control and management subject is Chungcheongbuk-do or Cheongju according to the Road Act. Although the system must work in a complex way,

The subjects of road control are Chungcheongbuk-do and Cheongju. And Chungcheongbuk-do directly directs the provincial fire headquarters, which oversees safety. In particular, in a disaster situation, what is important is whether the emergency rescue control group is operational. As the Disaster Safety Act was strengthened after the Sewol ferry disaster, firefighting departments took full responsibility for disasters that occurred on land, and the Coast Guard took full authority for disasters that occurred at sea. When the emergency rescue control group (control group) is activated, the leader will have strong authority to utilize all personnel, including the police, in relation to disaster-related measures. In the case of the Itaewon disaster, the control group was belatedly activated after the accident occurred. As a result, the emergency rescue control group’s exercise of authority was extremely limited in the fire department. Because of this, the responsibility of the police was greatly highlighted while the authority to take emergency measures such as road control was not effective in firefighting. However, if the control group is in operation, the story is different.

The emergency rescue control group consists of a central emergency rescue control group and a regional emergency rescue control group. In the case of regional emergency control groups, the head of the city/province emergency rescue control group becomes the head of the fire headquarters, and the head of the city/gun/gu emergency rescue control group becomes the head of the fire station. When the Emergency Rescue Control Group is activated, the leader has strong authority. According to Paragraph 2, Article 51 of the Framework Act on Disaster and Safety Management (Disaster Safety Act), “the regional control group may, if necessary for emergency rescue, request the head of the emergency rescue support agency to support emergency rescue activities, such as dispatching emergency rescue personnel to the scene or providing equipment and supplies necessary for emergency rescue. In this case, the head of the requested agency shall immediately comply with the request unless there is a special reason.”

According to <Pressian>’s coverage, it was confirmed that the regional emergency rescue control team was in operation at the Western Fire Station in Cheongju at the time. The operation time was 6:30 am on the 15th. Accordingly, the chief of the Cheongju West Fire Station becomes the leader. There is a reason why the operation of the Emergency Rescue Control Group is important.

When the emergency rescue control group is activated, the regional control group becomes the subject of exercise of full authority in emergency measures and emergency rescue. Regarding the Gungpyeong underpass disaster, Article 41 of the Disaster and Safety Act, the provision of establishing a dangerous area, can be applied.

Article 41 (Establishment of Dangerous Areas)

(1) The head of a Si/Gun/Gu and the head of a regional control group (applicable only when exercising authority prescribed by Presidential Decree; hereinafter the same shall apply in this Article) may establish a dangerous area if necessary to prevent harm to human life or body or maintain order, and order those not engaged in emergency measures to take the following measures:
1. Prohibiting or restricting access to or other activities in a dangerous area
2. Evacuation or evacuation from a dangerous area,

etc. Article 48 of the Act stipulates emergency measures by the head of control.

Article 48 (Emergency measures, etc. by regional control group)

① If necessary for emergency rescue, the head of a regional control group may request emergency measures under Articles 37, 38-2, 39, and 44 from the head of the central countermeasure headquarters, the mayor/province governor (referring to the head of the relevant headquarters if a city/province countermeasure headquarters is operated; hereinafter the same shall apply in this Article), or the head of a Si/Gun/Gu (referring to the head of the relevant headquarters if a Si/Gun/Gu countermeasure headquarters is operated; hereinafter the same shall apply in this Article), and the head of the central countermeasure headquarters, The Mayor/Do Governor or the head of a Si/Gun/Gu shall comply with the request unless there is any special reason.

② When the regional control group takes emergency measures under Article 37 and emergency measures under Articles 40 through 43 and 45, it shall immediately notify the head of the relevant Si/Gun/Gu. However, if urgent response is required, such as lifesaving and first aid, it may be notified after taking priority.

In other words, since the regional control group at the fire station level was already in operation under the Disaster Safety Act before the accident occurred, the road control authority was naturally granted according to the authority of the regional control group. If the leader of any organization, such as the police, or the head of a local government requests ’emergency measures’, they are obliged to follow immediately.

Going back to before the time of the accident, the information disseminated by the firefighters who first recognized the flooding of Mihocheon was only온라인카지노 delivered to Cheongju City, which is not the subject of road management at the site of the accident, through the Chungbuk Fire Headquarters situation room, and was not delivered to Chungbuk Province or its affiliated organizations. This happened because the Chungbuk Fire Headquarters did not even activate a provincial emergency rescue control team. Nevertheless, since the emergency rescue control team was in operation at the local fire station level, measures such as road control should have been taken here, but they did not.

In this case, much of the responsibility for failing to prevent human casualties lies with Chungcheongbuk-do and Cheongju, who did not properly recognize the risk information, and the fire authorities, who failed to actively administer emergency measures such as road control while the Emergency Rescue Control Team was in operation even after identifying the risk information of Mihocheon flooding.

An official from the disaster authorities pointed out, “Before the accident, the Cheongju Western Fire Department’s control group was already in operation, so if the authority such as emergency measures under the Disaster Safety Act had been exercised, such a disaster would not have occurred.”

However, the Office for Government Policy Coordination focuses on the fact that the first report requesting control of the vehicle was at 7:58 am, and that the police did not mobilize to the scene even after receiving a 112 report. Six police officers were asked to investigate, saying that they had entered false information in the 112 report processing system as if they had been dispatched. Regarding this, the police are refusing that there was an error in the tablet PC at the time. It is pointed out that the problem of the disaster management system is not only focusing on the wrong ‘making a criminal’. An official from the disaster authorities pointed out, “The core of the problem is to unify the disaster safety system and disaster prevention system and induce ‘active administration’.”

During his NATO tour on the 13th, two days before the accident, President Yoon Seok-yeol ordered an all-out government-wide response to the torrential rains. Prime Minister Han Deok-soo instructed each ministry to “make sure to carry out evacuation and control in advance to the extent that it is unreasonable, and to promptly issue an evacuation order if there is even the slightest danger.” However, as a result, this order was not implemented, and Chungcheongbuk-do did not even activate the emergency rescue control group. And on the morning of the 15th, even after recognizing the signs of danger, “excessive” control was not achieved.

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